@article {Levy107, author = {Moshe Levy and Golan Benita and Haim Levy}, title = {Financial Disclosure and Regulation}, volume = {32}, number = {2}, pages = {107--115}, year = {2006}, doi = {10.3905/jpm.2006.611811}, publisher = {Institutional Investor Journals Umbrella}, abstract = {A portfolio approach is used here to analyze the value of financial disclosure to stockholders and the need for disclosure regulation. This demonstrates that in a portfolio context the degree of public financial disclosure does not influence a firm{\textquoteright}s value. Hence, if disclosure is costly, firms have no incentive to disclose information voluntarily. Under partial disclosure, however, investors select inefficient portfolios, implying a substantial welfare loss; hence, we need regulation. The analysis provides a framework for determining optimal disclosure from the point of view of social welfare.TOPICS: Portfolio construction, legal/regulatory/public policy, in portfolio management}, issn = {0095-4918}, URL = {https://jpm.pm-research.com/content/32/2/107}, eprint = {https://jpm.pm-research.com/content/32/2/107.full.pdf}, journal = {The Journal of Portfolio Management} }