TY - JOUR T1 - Agency Ratings in the Pfandbrief Market JF - The Journal of Portfolio Management SP - 239 LP - 243 DO - 10.3905/jpm.2004.239 VL - 30 IS - 4 AU - Ludovic Breger AU - Darren Stovel Y1 - 2004/07/31 UR - https://pm-research.com/content/30/4/239.abstract N2 - Pfandbriefe are bond issues issued by German mortgage banks. Agency ratings do not play a significant role in the risk profile of jumbo Pfandbriefe, one type of Pfandbriefe, so it might be that the withdrawal of government guarantees and the prospect of agency rating downgrades do not mean more risk in the highly standardized jumbo market, with its many investor protections. Ratings do appear to have more relevance for the basic Pfandbriefe, where non-standardized issues, lower liquidity, and higher trading costs pose greater challenges for investors who wish to adjust their holdings quickly. There are systematic and sometimes large differences between Pfandbriefe and jumbo Pfandbriefe. Spread levels are clearly more homogeneous for jumbos than for Pfandbriefe. The higher liquidity and standardization of jumbo issues also results in a stronger benchmark where both issuer idiosyncrasies and risk are largely reduced. The risk modeling implications are clear; the two asset types should be treated separately. ER -